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Abstract
This paper examines trading behavior of market participants and how quickly private
information is revealed to the public. in a stationary financial market with asymmetric
information. We establish reasonable assumptions, under which the market is not efficient
in the strong form. in contrast to the Chau and Vayanos (2008) model. First, we assume
that the insider bears a quadratic transaction cost. We find that the trading intensity
of tilhe insider is inversely related to transaction cost and that the market maker's uncer-
tainty about private signals is positively related to transaction cost. As transaction cost
approaches zero, the economy converges to that of the Chau and Vayanos (2008) model.
Second, we assume that the insider can observe signals only discretely and at evenly spaced
times, at a lower frequency than that at which trading takes place. The sparseness of sig-
nals induces insiders to trade patiently before the next signal comes in, as in the finite
horizon model of Kyle (1985). Furthermore, the degree of market efficiency declines as
signals arrive more sparsely. Finally, we assume that arrival times of private insider sig-
nals are random. In such case, the insider is less patient and trades more smoothly than
with fixed arrival times As a result. market prices incorporate private information more
quickly.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Informed trading under asymmetric information has drawn the attention of numerous stud-
ies in the past few decades. Studies 1 have looked at such questions as: How are security
prices formed and how quickly is the information about profitability incorporated into the
prices? What is the role of market makers in the price discovery process? And will an
insider trade slowly to control the cost of price impact or quickly to make a quick killing?
These questions, which are part of the market mnlicrostructure research, are also related to
market efficiency. The efficient market hypothesis formulated by Eugene Fama in 1970,
suggests that, at any given time, all available inforination-public and private--is fully
reflected in the stock prices. This type of efficiency is called strong-form efficiency. On
the other hand, the semi-strong-form efficiency hypothesis states that only publicly avail-
able information, for example past prices, is incorporated into the market prices. While
it is p)lausible to think that strong-form efficiency does not describe reality2 , it is impor-
tant to understand what the conditions are for the market to closely resemble strong-form
efficiency.
The first generation of the informed trading literature, which begins with Kyle (1985),
'for example. Kyle (1985), Back (1992), Back, Cao and Willard (2000).
2 For example, Fama (1991)
examines strategic trading strategies and their price impact with competitive market mak-
ers. In the Kyle model of informed trading, a monopolistic insider strategically submits
orders to a competitive market maker and some liquidity traders submit exogenous order
quantities. The market maker can only observe the batch orders. In equilibrium, the
insider patiently submits orders and thus gradually reveals his private information. The
private information is fully revealed to the public only at the end of the trading session.
Clearly, this model does not reveal strong-form efficiency
In the Kyle model, the insider receives a signal at the beginning of the trading session.
This signal represents the final payoff of the risky asset at the end of the trading session.
Chau and Vayanos (2008) (henceforth CV) conjectures that this is a critical assumption
to induce the insider to trade slowly. CV studies the market efficiency in a stationary
framework with infinite horizon. In CV, the financial market is similar to that in the Kyle
model. The main difference is that the insider receives private information repeatedly.
CV adopts the notion of Wang (1993) that the private information is a mean reverting
stochastic process that determines the dividend growth rate of a risky stock. The insider's
objective is the present value of expected future profits. It is shown that in a discrete
time setting, the monopolistic insider reveals his information very quickly by placing a
large order each period; as the market approaches continuous time. the insider's rate of
order flow converges to infinity and the market maker's uncertainty about the insider's
information converges to zero. This says that the market can be arbitrarily close to strong-
form efficiency. However. the insider's profit does not converge to zero as the market
approaches efficiency, which means that there is nontrivial return to the cost of information
acquisition. This is in contrast with the usual postulation that the positive profits of the
insider are inconsistent with the strong form of the efficient market model3 .
It is argued in CV that the strong-form efficiency outcome is due to the combination of
impatience and stationarity rather than any peculiarity of their assumptions. More con-
3 For example, see Rozeff and Zaman (1988)
cretely, these authors show that impatience is introduced if any of three factors is present:
time discounting, publicly revealed information, and obsolescence of private information
through inean-reversion in the firm's profitability. CV also argues that impatience alone
cannot lead to the quick trading of the insider. It is the stationarity of the market, in addi-
tion to the insider's impatience that induces quick trading. Therefore, it may appear that
strong-form efficiency is a rolbust result that holds under relatively weak model assump-
tions. In this paper, we argue that this is not the case. That is. some of the assumptions
that are essential for strong form efficiency in CV may still be too strong to approximate re-
ality. Some of the assumptions in the CV model that fall into this category are described as
follows. First, the insider is risk neutral. so his signal precision is not taken into account as
lie optimizes his trading strategy. If the insider is risk averse, lie will trade less aggressively
and the degree of market efficiency goes down. Second. the market maker is risk neutral
and hence does not charge any inventory cost. Given the risk aversion of the market maker,
inventory cost may limit the insider's trading and acquisition of information by the market
maker. Third, the insider is not subject to any transaction cost. It is intuitive that very
high transaction cost will potentially prohibit the insider from trading quickly. Fourth, tile
insider is perfectly informed in the sense that he receives continuous private information
with no time lag. This can be relaxed in several ways. For example, the insider can receive
the signals at a lower frequency than the trading frequency. Another alternative is that
the insider receives the signals at stochastic times. This dissertation examines the effect of
these latter two assumptions.
First, we introduce a transaction cost in the quadratic form faced by the insider, that
intuitively prevents the insider from trading quickly. Ordinarily. traders face three types
of transaction cost: order processing cost. inventory cost and adverse selection cost. Here,
transaction cost can be regarded as an order professing cost. Note that, strictly speaking,
there should be no inventory cost if the market maker is assumed to be risk neutral.
Adverse selection cost also exists in the economy, due to asymmetric information. We
assume the transaction cost is quadratic with respect to the rate of the insider's trading, to
gain tractability for the model. Also note that the transaction cost is on the total position
of the insider, rather than a fixed cost per transaction. Nonetheless, this type of transaction
cost has a strong deterrent effect on the insider. In the presence of the transaction cost,
the insider trades slowly and the market is no longer strong-form efficient.
Next, we ask what is different if the insider receives private information at a lower
frequency than the one at which the trading takes place. In CV. the assumption that
the insider receives signals repeatedly is interpreted as an approximation of a proprietary-
trading desk. which generates a flow of private information on a stock through superior
research. There is no reason to believe that the agent always produces signals at a particular
high frequency. It is also assumed in the CV paper, however, that tile insider receives the
signals at the same frequency as the one at which the trading takes place. Hence it is natural
to relax the latter assumption with the assumption that the frequency of the private signal
is lower relative to trading frequency. For maximal tractability, we study a continuous
time model, i.e.. the frequency of trading is infinitely high. Private signals are assumed
to arrive at fixed and evenly spaced times. The infinite horizon market is still stationary,
although the equilibrium has certain dynamics within each period between two consecutive
signals. To focus on the effect of the frequency of the private signal. we let the transaction
cost be very small. We show that during the interval between two consecutive signals, as
time goes by the trading intensity of the insider increases, the price impact declines, and
the insider's informational advantage declines as well. More importantly, we show that, as
the frequency of the private signals of the insider decreases, the proportion of the private
information that is incorporated into the market price, which can be regarded as a measure
of market efficiency, also declines. In other words, the degree of market efficiency is lower
than that in the CV model, which shows approximate strong-form efficiency.
Finally, we relax the assumption that the insider receives private information at deter-
ministic and evenly spaced times. We study the alternative case, in which the arrival time
of the next signal is random. With a prop-trading desk example, this says that the research
department cannot guarantee that the new signal will be produced at a pre-specified time.
Instead, once a signal is produced, the next signal can be produced at any subsequent time
according to a probability distribution. To compare the two cases, we assume that the
mean arrival time in the stochastic arrival case is roughly the same as the arrival time in
the fixed arrival time case With the arrival time following a truncated exponential distri-
bution, we show that the insider trades more smoothly. That is. while in the fixed arrival
time case, the insider's trading intensity increases and shoots up immediately before the
next signal arrives; in the stochastic arrival time case, he trades more aggressively right
after receiving a new private signal, and less aggressively as time passes by, relative to the
case in which the arrival time of the signals is fixed. This is intuitive because in the fixed
arrival time case, the insider is very patient and waits until the moment immediately before
the next signal to use up his private information on the last signal. By contrast, in the
stochastic arrival time case, if he is too patient, his signal is likely to be wasted since the
next signal can arrive at any time, thus making his last signal obsolete. On the other hand,
the trading intensity of the insider increases less quickly in the later part of the trading
period because he is not sure when exactly the next signal will arrive.
To make a stark comparison between the CV model and our model with transaction
cost, we study a discrete time model in which the private signals of the insider arrive at
the same times that the trading takes place. This model converges to the CV model when
the transaction cost vanishes, and converges to a continuous time model with continuous
trading and a continuous private signal process. The latter model can also be obtained as
the limit in our primary model, as the frequency of tile insider signals increases without
bound. For this latter model with a continuous signal process. we obtain the comparative
statics of the variables of interest to highlight the effects of trading costs, for example,
liquidity and market maker's uncertainty, as the parameter corresponding to transaction
cost changes. When transaction cost decreases, the insider trades more aggressively, the
price impact increases, and the market maker's uncertainty about profitability decreases. In
particular, when transaction cost diminishes, the equilibrium solution approaches strong-
form efficic(y.
The other assumptions we discussed earlier but do not study in this paper are tile risk
aversion of the insider and the market maker. Wang (1993) studies a rational expectation
equilibrium model in a stationary infinite horizon economy, in which both the market
maker and the insider are risk averse. As a result, the market maker charges traders for
the inventory risks that tile market maker bears. In that model, the insiders are assumed
to be competitive, and the market maker and the insider submit demand schedules and
price is determined by the market clearing condition. This equilibrium shows very different
characteristics from those in CV(2008). In particular, no traders trade aggressively and
there is no strong-form market efficiency. The insiders trade quickly on their information
if they are risk neutral. Under the risk aversion assumption, however, they trade slowly
and the private information is revealed to the market gradually.
Chau (1999) also studies dynamic trading and market making in a similar framework.
The author's dynamic model involves the same market participants: a financial market with
a strategic large trader, a market maker, and noise traders. However, a major difference
is that in Chau (1999) the large trader and the market maker both face inventory costs,
which constitute the major source of risk investigated.
This thesis is organized as follows. In the next chapter, we study the general en-
vironment of continuous time trading and discrete private signals. Our model is very
comprehensive and nests many models as special cases. For example, if we take the limit
when the time interval between private signals goes to zero, then the private signals occur
continuously. This special case is discussed in Chapter 3. To make a clear comparison
between our model and the Chau and Vayanos (2008) model, we study a discrete time
model in Chapter 4, where trading times coincide with the times at which signals arrive.
Chapter 5 extends the first chapter by introducing the more general assumption that the
arrival times of private signals are stochastic.
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Chapter 2
A General Framework with
Discrete Private Signals
2.1 Introduction
It is argued in CV that the insider is impatient in a stationary financial market for three
reasons: time discounting, public revelation of insider information through dividends and
the obsolescence of insider information through mean reversion in the firm's profitability.
Nonetheless, it is still quite puzzling to see such a prominent model prediction as the
insider's quick trading. This dissertation seeks to contribute a deeper understanding of
why insider trading volume is so large. In this section, I examine the continuous time
model, in which the insider can receive only discrete signals. One simple conjecture is that,
since the insider has less informational advantage, he will trade less aggressively. While
this is true, I provide more detail on trading behavior between any two consecutive private
signals. More importantly, my results indicate that risk neutrality is probably a more
fundamental reason for the aggressive trading of the insider.
2.2 Model Setup
The model setup is similar to Chau and Voyanos (2008). There are two assets. The first
is a riskless bond with exogenous constant return r. The second is a stock that pays a
dividend at rate Dt, where Dt is a diffusion process with the following dynamics
dDt = v (gt - Dt) dt + o-DdB D .  (2.1)
It is mean reverting and its time varying mean gt is itself an Ornstein-Ulenbeck (OU)
process,
dgt = K (9 - gt) dt + agdB9  (2.2)
For simplicity, I assume that the two Brownian motions BD and B 9 are independent. The
dividend process and the dividend growth process, (2.1) and (2.2). are adopted from Wang
(1993); these have become standard in modeling asymmetric information in an infinite
horizon. As explained in Wang (1993), v (gt - Dt) is the expected growth rate of dividends.
The state variable gt can be interpreted as the true underlying profitability of the risky
asset. I require that v > 0 so that the dividend process indeed depends on the underlying
state variable gt. When n = 0, the process yt is simply a Brownian motion. Since our aim
is to investigate the implication of insider trading in a stationary financial market, I will
focus on the case in which N > 0.
The assumptions on the market participants are standard and follow Kyle (1985). There
are three types of traders: a market maker, an insider and noise traders. The market maker
is competitive and is risk neutral. The insider is risk neutral and behaves strategically. The
market maker and the insider have the utility function
E [jcM ' r(s-t) n
where c' denotes consumption at time s, and FT' denotes the information set at time t
of the market maker. It is helpful to notice that in the above utility function, since the
discounting is the same as the riskless interest rate, agents are indifferent about the timing
of consumption, and therefore value the consumption stream using the present value of
expected cash flow. discounted at the riskless interest rate. Noise traders are exogenous
and submit order flows as follows
dzt = r(dB
Let dxt denote instantaneous order flow of the insider trader. The market maker observes
only the aggregate order flow dxt + dzt.
For simplicity I assume that now the insider can observe signals only at evenly spaced
time intervals, but that trading still takes place continuously. Denote by A the length of
the time interval between signals of gt. Clearly, one of the complications of the model is
that the insider must estimate the true underlying short-run mean process g. We denote
his filtering solution as g'.
From the insider's perspective, the true value of the stock at time t is equal to the
present value of expected dividends conditional on his information. This value is similar
to the price set by the market maker, except that the expectation is conditional on the
insider's information set.
Vt = [J e r(s-t)Ddsj .
With the same calculation as for the market maker, the present value can be simplified as
Pt = AoDt + Aig + A2 -
The insider is also risk neutral, and has the object function
O_ 2maxtegy. In te bracket t of Pt he integrand is the instantaneous net
where Ot is the trading strategy. In the bracket of the integrand is the instantaneous net
profit at future time t. The first part of the net profit is the payoff from trading a quantity
Ot at time t; the second part is a quadratic transaction cost 1 . The introduction of the
transaction cost is the main difference between tile current paper and CV (2008). This is
motivated by the following economic intuition. The market price in the Kyle model is the
batch order price; therefore, there is no bid-ask spread. The market price reflects only the
market maker's inference based on batch orders, which includes the insider's trade. Trades
move prices because the insider is better informed than the market at large. However, this
kind of theoretical market price ignores two components in the actual transaction prices in
the market, order processing costs and inventory costs. Since we assume that the market
maker is risk neutral, then. strictly speaking under this assumption, there is no inventory
cost. In this paper, transaction cost can be considered the order processing cost, which
is assumed to be exogenous and has a quadratic form. On the other hand, if the market
maker is not risk neutral, there is a cost that the market maker charges to compensate for
bearing the inventory risk. In Wang (1993), the market maker is risk averse, so inventory
costs are built in endogenously.
Since the market maker is competitive and thus makes zero profits, he sets price as the
conditional expectation of the present value of expected future dividends of the stock
Pt = E r(s-t)Ddslm . (2.3)
His information set -tm involves two stochastic processes: the dividend process Dt and
the insider's trading strategy mt. The conditional expectation can be brought into the
integrand. By substituting in D and g we can show that the price is
Pt = AoDt + A 1E (g9t Fm) + A 2A
where A0 , A 1 and A2 are three positive constants depending on tile parameters. The details
'Perhaps the cost should be c 101 + E - 1[ >0o] This may be very difficult to solve though
are given in Appendix A. The resulting price is intuitive because the processes D and g
are jointly Markov. The interpretation is that the price positively depends on the current
level of dividends, and the levels of the short run mean g and the long run mean g, in a
simple linear way.
2.3 Equilibrium
Recall that the price set by the market maker is
Pt = AoDt + Alg' + A 2p (2.4)
where gm is the market maker's conditional expectation of the state variable gt given his
information set at time t. Similarly, the insider's valuation of the stock is given by the
above formula, except that the mean process gt is known by the insider.
vt = AoDt + Algt + A 2 j.
As a result, the insider's objective can be expressed as
maxE -rt [(q - gi) t A -19 ] (t . (2.5)
ot to
Below, we will let : = Al'c and abuse the notation to let c denote c. We consider linear
equilibrium in which the agents' strategies are linear functions of the state variables. In
particular, we assume that the insider has linear strategy of the following form
dxt = t3t (gI g m) dt. (2.6)
This carl be a candidate strategy only if gm is observable by the insider. From the pricing
equation (2.4), we see that the insider can infer a market maker's expectation g' fromn
observing the price. We also assume that the market maker sets the price according to
equation (2.4) with the conditional expectation having the following dynamics
dg' = K ( - gm ) dt + A (t)[dxt + dzt] + (t) [v (D - gm ) dt + dD] . (2.7)
The intuition of the above strategy by the market maker is as follows. The first term reflects
mean reversion of the true underlying process g. The market maker further updates his
belief on g with two pieces of incoming information, aggregate order flow, the second term,
and dividend payout, the third term.
Definition 1 A paZr of linear strategies (xt,pt) satisfying (2.4), (2.7) and (2.6) zs a Nash
equilibrium zf the followzng two condztzons hold:
1. Given the market maker's pricing rule (2.4) and (2.7), and insider chooses the optimal
strategy dxt = Otdt to maxiize hzs expected future profit (2.5). Given the insider's strategy
(2.6), the market maker sets przces equal to the conditzonal expectatzon of the present
dzscounted value of the stock with equatzon (2.3).
To solve the Nash equilibrium, we need to solve the market maker's inference problem
and the insider's optimization problem and then match their strategies.
2.4 Insider's Inference
At the beginning of each interval [t, t + A], the insider needs to solve the filtering problem.
He observes gt, and {D,.t < s < t + A}. and needs to find E [glsF].
Proposition 2 The filterng has soluton
dY 2 ()2 2ds = -2 s-, (t) =
ds 92
,where B3 D is a standard Brownzan Motzon in [t, t + A] under nsider's filtration.
Proof. See appendix. U
To make the behavior of Es regular, we assume that ag and (D are sufficiently large.
2.5 Market Maker's Inference
Recall that the market maker sets the competitive price as Ps = AoD, + Alg + A 2j.
where g' is his estimation given his information framework to time s. Suppose the insider's
strategy is dxs = Osdt = 3 (s) (g' - g ") dt. Then the market maker observes (xt, Dt) and
updates his estimation on (gt, g), denoted by (g', gm). Since the market maker knows
that the insider receives a perfect signal at the beginning time t. the market maker would
impose E (gt .tm) = E (g~ 7Fm). We denote the conditional variance of the market marker's
filtering problem by E (t) - Var ((gt, g') .Ft"), which is a 2 by 2 matrix. The (i, j) element
of this matrix is denoted by E,3. To satisfy the stationarity condition, it is required that
the variance E (t) , as a function of time, is the same on each interval [lA, (1 + 1) A]. In
particular. let t = IA and we have
E ie (t A) - Z11 (t) - t/ d rl (s) = 0.
Now we state the results of the filtering problem for the market maker as follows.
gZm (s) andProposition 3 The solution to the filterng satisfies gm (s)
dgm = K ( - g) dt + {C1 (s) v2 2 ( _ g
+ r (s) V--ldB D + Y 2 (s) 38 u, ldBu
The conditonal variances are gzven by
d11= -2 - ,+ C - (m)2 V2 D2
ds I 1f g 11 V D
dE2 2 = 2KEZ 2D22
_
m V2
ds
d22 -2 (K + E , 2, ) D) (m
ds - L\ ~ D L22 - L12
Ygm)}dt
(ym 3)2 , 2
-2 m m
D 11 12
)2 2 2 _ ( 3s) 2 u -2
and they satisfy
Proof. See appendix. *
Therefore we can substitute the observable processes (xt, zt, Dt) into the above SDE of
gmn, and the linear pricing rule expressed using the observable is
dgm /- ( g") ds - 3 (s) vgmds + A (s) [0sds + rudB'] + ' (s) [dD, + vDds]
where A (s) - Em (s) 1j 2 and - (s)wiil;~\1= L12 U3 ~S E1z (s) vU7D.
2.6 Insider's Optimization
According to the Nash equilibrium, we conjecture that the insider anticipates that the
pricing rule of the market maker is
- (s) vg m ds + A (s) [dxt + dzt] + (s) [dD, + vDsds] .
(2.8)
m) + E~ S cr)32 ( 2
mm32 -2
E22 l12 s Cu
E" (s) = E, (s) + Y (, E2 (S) = Ym () .12 \ 22 ~1
dgm _ g ) ds
As before, the insider's objective function is the expected present value of the the total
profit, which is equivalent to
max E e-rt [(g9) Ot c0 2] dt.
Ot JO
Now the insider receives discrete signals at times {lA}tcz. which makes his optimiza-
tion problem mathematically more complex. We can approach the insider's dynamic pro-
gramming problem as a discrete one with continuous control variable Os over each in-
terval [lA, (1 + 1) A]. Formally, we define the insider's value function at time 1A to be
V (1, g, g~n). The insider's optimization is a Markov control problem and the market
maker's estimation error is the only state variable because it is Markov as
( Mi-) A-Y1)A)= 6 A(lA)-A((l+1)A) 1[) (2.9)
+ /-A( + I A )  A(s)A (s) -A (s) [Osds + rudBu] - 1 (s) v 1 dB D
where A (.) is defined by (log A (s))' = (K + (s) v). This dynamic of the state variable
is proved in the appendix. We explicitly write the time 1 in the value function simply to
facilitate understanding the derivations. The market stationarity guarantees that the value
function is time independent.
The discrete time dynamic programming problem with infinite horizon has the following
Bellman equation
V(1, g - g-)
sup Et' { - r(t) [(q, _ g,) 0, _ c0 2 dt + c rAV (I + 1, gt+A, }'
{O ,t<s<t+A} t
where the state variable evolves according to equation (2.9). The state variable is a discrete
time stochastic process, observable to the insider at each discrete time IA. Notice that at
the discrete times {lA}lCz, the insider knows the true value of g. and thus g'.a = g .As
emphasized above, one special property about this dynamic programming problem is that
the control variable is a continuous function over each period [lA, (1 + 1) A] Therefore, the
Bellman equation above cannot be solved by routine methods, such as taking derivatives
to obtain first order conditions. Instead, we must solve it by considering the continuous
time optimal control problem on the finite time interval [IA, (1 + 1) A]. In particular, let us
consider the insider's short term (per period) objective function, given the value function
V (1, gt - g') at the discrete times {lA}1,z
sup E - r(s-t) [(gs gs) 0, - c02] dt + e-rAV ( + 1 gtA A)}
{O ,t<s<t+ tIA}
d (g' - gnm) = [ + (s) v] (g _ gm) dt - A (s) Odt
-A (s) (dB + [E - (s)] vadBO D
This is the finite horizon stochastic control problem. Denote the value function by J (s, g - g)
then, the discrete time Bellman equation is just
V (1, Y - gm) = J (0, gA- g ). (2.10)
We address this equation later. For the finite horizon per period problem, the terminal
value is
9(1+ 1 A - 9(~+1) = e-' EI+1) V ( + 1, 9(l+1)A, 9 1)A . (2.11)
Therefore, the per period problem can be solved using the regular approach, the Hamilton-
Jacobian-Bellman equation. To summarize, the insider's problem can be broken down into
two pieces. The outside piece is a discrete time infinite horizon problem, with a continuous
time control variable. The inside piece is a finite horizon continuous time stochastic control
problem. The solution to the latter problem can be considered to play a similar role as the
first order condition of an ordinary discrete time Bellman equation.
Proposition 4 The finte horizon stochastic control problem has the following solutzon.
The value functon is given by
J (s, g g m) = e -r [a (s) (gI - )2 + (s)
where the functions a (-) and 6 (-) satisfy the ordinary dzifferentzal equations
0 = -ra (s) (2.12)[1 2a (s),A(s)]
2
+ a' (s) - 2(s) [K + (s)V D2  2a (s) A4c
0 =-r (s) + ' (s) + a (s) [(A (s) )+ I-ru Z i (1)]2 ]
The terminal value conditions for these equations are gzven below: they combine the ter-
mznal condztion of the per period problem and the Bellman equaton of the infinzte horizon
dynamzc programming problem. The optimal control of the insider is gzven by
[1- 2a (s) A (s)] ( )
2c
Proposition 5 The value function of the infinmte horizon problem zs
V (1, g - g,) = a (0) (g - gm2 + 6 (0)
where a (-) and 6 (.) satisfy the ordinary
the terminal value conditions
a (A a
A) an=
dzfferentzal equations in the last proposition and
(0)
(0) Z (A) + (0).
The control varable is gzven in the last proposition.
2.7 Equilibrium Solution
In this subsection we fully solve the equilibrium. The insider receives the signals at discrete
times {lA}tz, which leads to the new properties of the model. During each interval
[1A, (1 + 1) A], the market maker and the insider have their time dependent strategies,
involving deterministic functions A (t), (t) and 3 (t). The estimation uncertainty of the
market maker E (t), the functions a (t) and 3 (t) in the insider's value function, are also
time dependent. Since the insider's uncertainty has an exact relation with the market
maker's uncertainty E (s) = E (s) - E (s), we treat it as a separate function in the
mathematical derivation of the solution. Because the market is of infinite horizon and is
stationary, it is necessary that all strategies utilized by the participants and other related
deterministic functions are the same during each time interval [lA, (1 + 1) A]. This is in
the same spirit as a standard infinite horizon discrete dynamic programming problem.
To find the equilibrium solution, we combine the market maker's inference and the
insider's inference and optimization, using the definition of Nash equilibrium. We have the
following eight deterministic functions
to solve. We have eight equations and three terminal conditions for three differential
equations. The number of constraints is just enough to identify the unknowns. It turns
out that we can derive two equations involving only two functions (E', a (s)) and thus
solve them first. All other functions can be obtained consequently. Details are in the
appendix C.
The equilibrium solutions can be visualized as in figure 2-1 and 2-2. In figure 2-1, the
transaction cost coeffici(nt is c = 0.4, while in figure 2-2, the coefficient is c = 0.004. The
plots are very informative. We start by examining the case in which there is nearly no
transaction cost, i.e. c = 0.004. First, the insider trades very patiently. In addition, the
trading intensity of the insider explodes at the end of the trading interval. In this respect,
the market within the interval between two consecutive signals of the insider has similar
characteristics as that in the Kyle model. The factors behind this phenomenon are similar
to the factors in the Kyle model. However, we observe several new and interesting points,
as follows.
Second. it is helpful to examine the information asymmetry Ell (s) - E z (s) plotted in
the top left panel. At the moment when each trading period starts, the market maker
has the greatest information disadvantage since the insider knows the signal precisely.
As the market maker learns from the aggregate order flow, which includes the insider's
orders, information asymmetry is reduced gradually. At the end of the trading interval,
the insider submits huge order flows and drives the difference between the uncertainties
between the two players close to zero. With this result, it is not difficult to understand the
market maker's and the insider's individual uncertainties. During each trading interval, the
insider's uncertainty about the signal increases from zero, and how large it becomes depends
on the length of the interval A. For example, if A is very large, the insider's uncertainty
E increases until it finally stabilizes at the steady state variance of the true process gt. By
comparison, the market maker's uncertainty about the true signal yt starts high, decreases,
then increases to the extent that it becomes very close to the insider's uncertainty. In the
end, the market maker's uncertainty reassumes its level at the beginning of the trading
period, as required by the stationarity of the infinite horizon market. In the first part of
the interval the market maker's uncertainty is dominated by the fact that his information
asymmetry is decreasing. In the second part of the interval the market maker's uncertainty
is mainly influenced by the fact that the insider's uncertainty is increasing.
Third, the price impact A (t) decreases during the trading period. This is in contrast
with the Kyle model in which A is a constant over the finite period. From the expres-
sion A (t) = E (s) 3 (s) 2. we see that there are two effects that determine the size
of the price impact A (t). The first effect is the insider's relative information precision
YE (s) = Ern (s)- E (s). In our model, tile insider knows the true mean g perfectly only at
the beginning of the trading period. His uncertainty gradually increases, as depicted in the
top-right panel. In the Nash equilibrium, the market maker anticipates this and therefore
sets prices less responsively as time goes by. The second effect that influences A is the pro-
portion of the insider's orders relative to the order size of the noise traders 3 (s) /cr. This
proportion increases over time within the interval and hence moves the price impact A (t)
upward. The first effect dominates and consequently A (t) decreases over time. However,
in the Kyle model there is only one signal received by the insider, the final payoff at the
end of the trading period. The two effects defined above exactly offset each other in the
Kyle model. Actually. it is the constant A that achieves an equilibrium solution.
Finally, it is inspiring to notice the following seemingly contradictory properties in this
market. On the one hand, the insider loses his information advantage gradually. On the
other hand, at the end of the trading period, his trading intensity shoots up sharply. This
is in accordance with tile Kyle model but is surprising in our framework, since the insider
can become ignorant of the true mean g himself but he still trades arbitrarily aggressively.
Close to the end of the trading interval, the insider anticipates the next signal, and thus
he will submit enormous orders to use up his information from the last signal, no matter
how tiny is his information advantage. This demonstrates the fact that the risk neutrality
assumption on the part of the insider is so strong that it produces implausible results.
When we turn to the chart for relatively greater transaction cost, i.e., c = 0.4, we
find the expected results. The insider's trading intensity increases very slowly and does
not jump up close to the end of the trading period. This is because the transaction cost
deters him from doing so. As a consequence, information asymmetry deceases over time
less rapidly and furthermore, the market maker's information uncertainty decreases to a
lesser extent before rising.
We also compare the equilibria in two markets in which the insider receives signals
at different frequencies, with everything else equal. The results of the case with higher
frequency are plotted in figure 2-3. At high frequency, the insider's uncertainty only slightly
increases before the next signal arrives. Since his estimation of the true mean is accurate,
he trades more aggressively over the short period. This is turn explains why the market
maker's uncertainly is small in absolute terms. In addition, each interval is shorter so the
insider's trading intensity is smoother, explaining why the market maker's uncertainty is
large relative to the insider's uncertainty. A reasonable measure of market efficiency is
Z*- Z (S)
where the numerator is the excess of the conditional uncertainty of the market maker
over that of the insider, and the denominator is the difference between the estimation
uncertainty, assuming the dividend rate to be the only observable element of the filter.
and the insider's conditional uncertainty. Equivalently, the denominator is the amount of
private information that the insider holds, and the numerator is the difference between the
precision of information between the market maker and the insider. In other words, the
numerator is the portion of the private information that is not incorporated into the market
price. This fraction is never greater than 1. In figure 2-3. this fraction is roughly between
one-half and zero during the interval between the two consecutive signals. By contrast,
in figure 2-2, this fraction is much larger, close to 1 most of the time. Therefore, we can
conclude that with higher frequency of the insider's signals, the market is more efficient.
The intuition is that when the insider receives signals more frequently, as explained above,
his trading is smoother, and therefore the market maker can track his private information
more closely.
Overall, when the insider receives signals only at discrete times, the market efficiency
in strong form does not hold, even as the transaction cost is infinitesimal. The market is
less efficient when the transaction cost is greater or when the insider receives signals less
frequently.
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2.8 Conclusion
The results of Chau and Vayanos (2008), that a stationary market with a monopolistic
insider is approximately efficient in the strong form, is quite interesting and surprising.
However, these results do not seem to reflect real financial markets. In particular, it is
not plausible that the insider would submit a huge order flow constantly over an infinite
horizon. We find that in the CV model there are some seemingly moderate assumptions
that actually deviate from reality. These assumptions are critical for the derivation of
strong form efficiency in the CV model, and relaxing these assumptions can potentially
reconcile the empirically doubtful conclusions of strong-form efficiency. We introduce two
more realistic assumptions, namely that there exist transaction costs and that the frequency
of signal arrivals and the frequency of trading are different.
We show that the presence of a transaction cost in the quadratic form faced by the
insider will prevent the insider from trading quickly. Moreover. the market is no longer
efficient in the strong form. In addition, we introduce the assumption that the insider
receives private information at a lower frequency than the frequency at which trading
takes place. The solution of the equilibrium shows that between two consecutive signals,
there is an interesting pattern of trading intensity of the insider, price impact, and the
insider's informational advantage. Furthermore, the degree of nmarket efficiency is lower
than the case in which the frequency of private signals equals the frequency of trading.
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Chapter 3
Limiting Case with Continuous
Private Signals
3.1 Model Setup
In this chapter, we study a limiting case where the length of time intervals between the
insider's private signals goes to zero. The assumptions different from before will be high-
lighted.
As before, the market maker sets the price as the conditional expectation of the present
value of expected future dividends of a stock
Pt = E C r(s t)DdsFn . (3.1)
This can be simplified to be
Pt = AoDt + Algt + A 2g (3.2)
where < is the market maker's conditional expectation of the state variable gt, given his
information set at time t.
Notice that the insider observes g perfectly, so we replace E (gtIF) in the market
maker's valuation by g. From the insider's prospective. the present value of the stock can
be simplified as
Pt = AoDt + Algt + A 2g.
As a result, the insider's objective can be expressed as
maxE e-rt [(9 - ) t A1-'ro0] dtl-to 1 (3.3)
Ot t o
We consider linear equilibrium, in which the agents' strategies are linear functions of state
variables. In particular, we assume that the insider has linear strategy of the following
form 2
dxt = 3t (g - g) dt. (3.4)
We also assume that the market maker sets the price according to equation (3.2) with the
conditional expectation having the following dynamics
dgt = K (g - .) dt + A (t) [dxt + dzt] + (t) [v (D - g) dt + dD] . (3.5)
Definition 6 A pair of linear strategzes (xt,pt) satisfyzng (3.2), (3.5) and (3.4) is a Nash
equzlzbrzum zf the followzng two conditions hold:
1. Given the market maker's pricing rule (3.2) and (3.5), insider chooses the optzmal
strategy dxt = Otdt to maxzmnze hzs expected future profit (3.3). Given the znsider's strategy
(3.4), the market maker sets prices equal to the condztzonal expectation of the present
discounted value of the stock wzth equatzon (3.1).
1In the following we will let c = A lc and abuse the notation to let c denote .
2 This can be a candidate strategy only if g is observable by the insider. From the pricing equation (3.2),
we observe that the insidei can infer market maker's expectation gt from observing the price.
3.2 Market maker's filtering problem
First we look at the market maker's inference problem. The market maker updates his
belief about the underlying state variables based on the observed variables, the dividend
process. and the aggregate order flow submitted by the insider and the noise traders. We
follow the standard Kalman-Bucy 3 filtering technique to derive the solution to the inference
problem.
Formally, the market maker observes the aggregate order flow and the dividend process
(Y, D). Dividend evolves according to equation (2.1) and total order flow satisfies the
following stochastic differential equation
dYt = gt - t) dt + audB'.
Equivalently, the processes (I,)D), defined by the following SDE evolution
DO 07D dBD
are observable to the market maker. The unobserved state variable is the dividend growth
dgt = K (g - t) dt + odB.
Define .& = E (g:|I.') and Var (yt1 T).
Proposition 7 Gzven the znszder's strategy (3.4), the market maker wzll update the con-
dztzonal expectatzon g and the condztonal varzance E of the state varzable g by
dg = K ( - ) dt + A (t) [Odt + orudZu] + , (t) [v (g - g) dt + o7DdBD] (3.6)
3 Lipster and Shiryaev (2001).
and
E' (t) = -2E (t) + - E2t) t + 
2
where A (t) = Y (t) 36tl/2 and 2 (t) = tv/o
The filtering theory tells us that the estimate g is updated because g is expected to
change, and because new information from observable processes is available. The first
term reflects the part of g that is expected to change in the same manner as g. The new
information from the observable processes is incorporated into the estimation, as there is
a correlation between the state variable and the drift of the observable variables (, D).
The second term of the RHS of equation (3.6) reflects the correlation between g and Y,
and the third term reflects the correlation between g and D.
Notice that the conditional variance evolves deterministically and satisfies an ordinary
differential equation of the Reccati type, but in general there is no closed form solution of
the differential equation. However, we can circumvent this problem if we are only interested
in the steady state of the stationary financial market. The convergence of the filters to their
steady state solution is proved, under mild conditions, in Anderson and Moore (1979). In
the steady state, the uncertainty E (t) is constant over time and therefore E' (t) _ 0. The
insider's strategy is also constant; therefore, we obtain an algebraic equation of the two
varialbles E and 3
-2KE + r ± 2 + = 0. (3.7)
Furthermore, when the market maker can only infer the process gt based on observation
of the dividend process, his conditional variance of gt is greater than the case in which he
observes both gt and Dt. In the former case, the steady state conditional variance satisfies
the quadratic equation (3.7) where the strategy 3 is replaced by zero. and the valid solution
is given by
V - l d
To facilitate the equilibrium analysis. we write the filtering solution (3.6) as a stochastic
differential equation of the observable variables of the market maker
dgt = K (g - g) dt + A [dxt + dzt] + " [v (D - g) dt + dD] . (3.8)
As explained above, the market maker updates his estimate of g using the information on
the aggregate order flow and the dividend cash flow In the steady state of the stationary
financial market, A (t) and " (t) are not time dependent.
3.3 Insider's optimization
Notice that the insider cannot observe the total order flow as the market maker does;
therefore, he cannot imitate the market maker by working out the filtering problem to
obtain the market maker's conditional expectation of the insider's private information.
However, recall that the market maker sets the price as in equation (3.2), thus the insider
can infer the market maker's conditional expectation of the insider's private information
from the price process and the dividend cash flow.
In the Nash equilibrium, the insider anticipates a rational pricing rule of the market
maker. In our model, due to perfect competition, the market maker sets price as the
present value of the expected future dividend cash flow. conditional on his information set.
By the assumed Markov property of the processes (D, g). the pricing rule is determined by
equation (3.2). Therefore, the pricing rule essentially boils down to an updating scheme
of short run mean g. We assume that the insider anticipates the market maker updates g
using equation (3.8), which is equivalent to
d = K (g - g) dt + Adt + A (t) a>dZ + [v (g - g) dt + aDdBD]
Then Insider's optimization is
max E e
Ot O
rt [(9g g) Ot - cO2] dt.
This is a standard stochastic control problem. The state variables are (g, g). However, a
more careful look renders
d(g- g)
= K ( g) dt + ogdB g A (t) Odt - A (t) adZ" - ~ (t) [v (g -) dt + cDdBD]
= [(K - v3t) ( - g)- A (t) 8] dt + ugdB g A (t) a(dZu - -3taDdBD
This, in addition to the function form of the optimization objective, says that the estimation
error of the market maker is tile single state variable of the insider's stochastic control
problem.
Let J (t, g - g) denote the value function. Then the value function satisfies the HJB
equation
0 = sup Jt + J [(JKOt
vt) (9 - 9) - A (t) 0] + Jgg [(g)2 +
+ [(g - g) Ot - 2] C-,rt
s.t. [(K "t) (9 g) A (t) 0] dt + (gdB g
lim E [J (7, g
T--+OO
) ] = 0.
Suppose the functions A (t) and 7 (t) are not time varying.
Proposition 8 The HJB equatzon has a solutzon of the form
J (t,. - ) = e-rta ( - 2 e-rt6
A (t) oadZu - 'tDdBD
-2 2 2 2 ],At +;t ]
where a and 6 satisfy the following equations
0 = -r + c2 + a (A2 2 + 22D) (3.9)
0 = -ra - 2a (yv + ,) + - (1 - 2aA)2 . (3.10)
4c
The optimal tradng strategy zs linear and gzven by
-2aA + 1
0= (g- g). (3.11)2c
Proof. See appendix. U
The main conclusion is that given the market maker's pricing rule, the insider chooses
a linear trading strategy. The value function is a quadratic function of the market maker's
estimation error. It is important to notice that when deriving the insider's optimal solution,
we have already incorporated the fact that in the steady state, the market maker's choices
A (t) and -' (t) are constants, which in turn implies that the insider's strategy depends on
tile state variable in a time invariant fashion, and so does the value function, except the
time decaying e-rt. The stationarity of the economy is the main difference between this
paper (also CV (2008)) and Kyle (1985).
Comparison between our infinite horizon model of a stationary financial market and
the finite horizon model is in order. In the Kyle (1985) model. trading occurs over a finite
horizon [0, T]. At the beginning of the trading period, the insider learns about the final
payoff v - VT of the stock. There is no dividend payout of the stock. The noise trader
is assumed, as before, to submit exogenous order flows dzt = o,,dBt independent of tilhe
insider. If the market maker's pricing rule is dPt = At (dxt + dzt), then the risk-neutral
insider has the value function
1 1
J(t,v -P) (v - P)2 + - a (T t)2A 2
where the terminal condition is J (T, v - P) = 0. There are two major differences between
the Kyle model and our model. First, in the Kyle model, the insider's trading strategy is
not determined by his own optimization problem, since the HJB equation is linear in the
insider's trading strategy Ot. For the insider's optimal control problem to have a solution,
the terms in HJB that do not relate to Ot should add up to zero. This requires that the
market maker sets A (t), the reciprocal of the market depth, to a constant. The terminal
value condition of the value function implies E (vl.F) = 0. Therefore, the insider's strat-
egy is determined in the following way. The insider chooses 3 (t) such that the market
maker, given 3 (t), chooses a constant A (t) and infers the terminal payoff perfectly. i.e.
E (vTFF) = 0. In the Kyle model the equilibrium solution strongly depends on the Nash
equilibrium concept. This is quite different from the common property of optimization
problems, that the solutions are usually given by first order conditions. In our model, the
insider's strategy is determined by his optimal control problem, because with the quadratic
transaction cost, the HJB equation is not linear in Ot. Second, in the Kyle model, in prin-
cipal the insider's trading intensity 3 (t) and the market maker's liquidity choice A (t) are
deterministic functions of time, since the financial market has a finite horizon. Although
it turns out that A (t) is a constant, it is only a special property of the Nash equilibrium
solution. On the other hand, in our model, since we have a stationary framework, any
control variables must be constant over time. This places a strong requirement on the
equilibrium solution. Later we will show that stationarity is indeed much more restrictive
than it appears.
It is helpful to point out a caveat. The insider's strategy given by equation (3.11) may
seem to implicate that insider's trading intensity 3 = (1 - 2cA) /2c explodes as transaction
cost diminishes. Although this result is true, the reasoning behind it goes beyond this
equation alone. The variables a and A are themselves affected by the parameter c. To
analyze the comparative statics, we must solve the equilibrium, that is, to solve for the
variables as functions of the parameters only.
3.4 Equilibrium solution
To solve the steady state equilibrium values of (EE, A, a, 6. , 3), we combine the solutions to
the market maker's inference problem and the insider's optimization problem and obtain
a system of equations. These can be simplified as follows.
Proposition 9 (A. E) are jointly determined by the following system of equations.
A2 = 1 -2K + 2 V E2
0 = E (E - 2cAc) (r + 2K + 2v2o 2 ) - 2cA30.
The remainder of the parameters (a. 6., 3) can be solved subsequently.
E 2cAo
a-
2AE
2a 2
2 
-
= 
.2 
-
The limiting behavzor as the transaction cost diminishes zs
lim A =
c10 01
limE = 0,
c--0
lin 3 = co,
c-O
lim = 0.
c-0
The results are easy to interpret. First, when the transaction cost is small, the solution
is consistent with the discrete time setup in CV (2007), in the sense that there is approx-
imate strong form market efficiency. The insider's rate of trading is huge and the market
maker's uncertainty about the underlying true profitability gt is negligible. However, mar-
ket depth converges to a constant a,u/g and we show that the insider's profit converges to
a positive constant. It is clear that there does not exist a Nash equilibrium in the continu-
ous time model in the limit when there is no transaction cost. Second, our model explains
more than CV about what is the outcome when the insider bears a transaction cost. There
exists an equilibrium in which the insider's trading intensity is finite and the market maker
cannot infer the true signal gt perfectly from the aggregate orders and the dividend rate.
In such case. the market is not strong form efficient. We can calculate comparative statics
from the solution to the model. The parameters are plotted in Figure 1 as the transaction
cost varies.
3.5 Conclusion
We take the limit in the general model as the frequency of the insider's private signals
increasing to infinity, which means private signals are observed continuously. In this special
case, every deterministic process that the market maker and the insider control becomes
constant in equilibrium. rather than periodic as in Chapter 1. For example, E(t), a(t),
q(t) are constant over the infinite horizon. Major effects resulting from trading costs are
highlighted in the simpler model. For example, we show that if there is a transaction cost
in the quadratic form faced by the insider, it will prevent the insider from trading quickly.
Moreover, the market is no longer efficient in the strong form.
Chapter 4
Discrete Trading and Comparison
with Strong Form Efficiency
4.1 Discrete Trading Setup
In this section, we briefly describe the results for a discrete framework, in which trading
takes place at fixed and evenly spaced times. The private signals of the insider are assumed
to arrive exactly at these trading times. This framework extends that in the CV model
by only bringing in a trading cost for the insider; therefore, the model here nests the CV
model. The continuous time model in Chapter 2 can also be considered a limiting case, as
the trading interval shrinks to zero, of the discrete time model in this chapter.
The assumptions are the same as in the above continuous time model, except that
trading takes place at a set of discrete times {lh},,z. There is a quadratic transaction cost
for the insider's trades, otherwise this economy is essentially the same as the one in CV
(2007).
The dividend rate is mean reverting
D, = D-_ 1 + vh (g1-g - Dl-1) + ED.
with the short run mean process g itself reverting to a constant g according to
g9 = gi-1 + Kh (9 - gi-1) + Eg,l.
The parameters v and K determine the reversion rate of these processes. The errors ED,l
and Eg,I are both i.i.d. and independent of each other, and normally distributed with mean
zero and variances a2 h and a2 h, respectively. The market maker is competitive anrid sets
the price as the expected present value of future dividend streams conditioned on his
information set
P = E [ A Dhe |(lF)hFm = AoD + A 1E (gilFT/') + A 2j
where the second equality is derived as above by substituting into the processes (D1,, g91);
this essentially results from the joint Markov property of the dividend rate and the true
underlying mean. Noise traders' orders at time lh are Eu,t, with mean zero and variance
72h.
We consider only linear strategies for the market maker and the insider. The market
maker's inference is conjectured to evolve according to
g = (1 - /h) gi-1 + Khy + D (D1 (1 1 - ,h) Dr_ 1 - vhl_1) + AX (x 1 + ul) .
We also conjecture the insider's trading strategy to be
The insider is risk neutral and bears transaction cost cx /h for trading at time lh. Thus,1/L V I~lljLL~~IICb~ ILD
his objective function is
maxE Z X (gi - ) - c e-r( '-r ) f
The equilibrium can be solved in the usual fashion. We first solve the market maker's
inference problem given the insider's strategy 3 (gl- - ~1-1), aind define his conditional
variance of the state variable to be E, - Var (gf i). Then given the market maker's
estimation g and the pricing rule, we solve the insider's optimization problem, obtaining
a quadratic value function B (g- j1_1)2 + C in our case, and optimal trading intensity
3. Finally, we combine the solutions of the two players. There is no simple closed form
solution to the equilibrium. The equilibrium is characterized by a system of equations,
which are presented in the appendix. However, the limiting behavior when the trading
interval vanishes can be expressed easily as in the following proposition.
Proposition 10 The equzlbrzum  s determined by system of equations, as follows
[1 - (K + VAD) h] (1 - 2A e-rhB)
2 (Ax + ch - - Ae-rhB)
2  1 + 4e-rBclh-
4 (Ax + ch-1 - A2 -rhB)'
C -e - rhB (A 2 + A2 + 2 ) h.
-D ( C D D XJ 9±4 h
(1 - Nh) EahAD --
E, (320 r+ v 2 ogh 2 ) + 2 u2'D,2 D D -2h'
(1 - lh) 2 9  h 2
Whe (322 v2 2h 2 2h
W (32T 2q +c v 2r to h2) + (r ( oloh g
When h - 01 the equilzbrzum converges to the equilibrium solution to the continuous time
model as presented in proposition 9
lir 1g, Ax, B, C, A \D, )- A,, •
Proof. See appendix. *
4.2 Comparison with Strong-form Market Efficiency
CV (2008) computes the equilibrium in a discrete time setting with infinite horizon. Our
discrete time model nests their model, since we add a transaction cost. As the transac-
tion cost approaches zero, we can derive the equilibrium results of the CV model. For
convenience, we list the main results from CV (2008) below.
Proposition 11 When the insider zs trading., the asymptotzc behavior of the equhbrium
zs characterzed by
AD 2
lirn 9
lirn Ax =
h-0 au
lim s- _w l i
h-O V/h r2
lirn B -
h-O 2-g
lim C = -
h-i r
What, as CV (2007) claims, is most striking is that when calendar time converges to
zero, the size of insider's trading 3 is v/h, which is larger than order h. Therefore, the
rate of order size 3/h converges to infinity. In addition. the insider's trading reveals more
and more information, as seen from the fact that E9 is also of order v/h, which means
that the market maker's uncertainty about the insider's private information converges to
zero as the time interval converges to zero. Another important variable is the insider's
trading volume, xj = 3 (gl-1 - 91-1), which is of order h3 / 4 . Thus the volume generated
by the insider within a fixed time interval is of order h- 1/4, which converges to infinity
when h goes to zero. The marker maker's estimation is also interesting. The updating
of his belief about g depends on total order flow and dividend rate through Ax and AD.
respectively. As the trading interval approaches zero, the price impact of the dividend rate
converges to zero. This is intuitive, because the market maker's update needs not rely as
much on dividend rate when the insider places a huge, informative order flow. It may be
surprising that the price impact of the aggregate order flow converges to a finite number,
since total order flow is more informative than the Kyle model. This is explained in CV
(2008) that the market maker faces less uncertainty and the information has smaller effect
on the prices.
As we are interested only in model implications for the near continuous trading case,
our discrete time model stands in notable contrast with the CV model. First, the CV
model does not converge to an equilibrium model in continuous time, since the equilibrium
solution diverges as h approaches zero. Our discrete time model converges to a continuous
time model when the trading interval approaches zero, as seen in proposition 11. In our
discrete time model, so long as the transaction cost is not zero. the insider's rate of trading
does not explode when h approaches zero. In particular, the rate of trading of the insider,
measured by parameter 3, is of order h, as opposed to order f in the CV model. Another
difference is the insider's profit margin gl - y1. This also converges to zero in the CV
model but does not do so in our model. The magnitude of the profit margin not only
determines the insider's profit, but also has an effect on the insider's trading volume. It
is natural to see that the insider's profit has a nonzero limit. Combining the properties of
3 and (g - g), we observe that the volume of the insider's trading xl = 3 (gi-i - 1- 1) is
also h, which means that the rate of trading volume with respect to time between trading
converges to a finite number. This is a crucial difference from the CV model. Consequently,
the market maker cannot infer insider information perfectly. In other words, the market
maker's uncertainty Eg about the true mean g converges to a positive number. Therefore
the continuous time limit of the financial market is not strong form efficient any more, so
long as the transaction cost exists.
CV explains in detail that the main difference between their model and the Kyle model
is the stationarity of the market. Here, stationarity refers mainly to the fact that the
insider repeatedly receives private signals, the true underlying short run mean g of the
dividend rate. It is this kind of stationarity that drives the insider to be much less patient
than the insider in the Kyle model. In our model, however, the insider is also impatient.
The additional quadratic transaction cost prohibits him from trading aggressively.
Our model nests the CV model. When the transaction cost approaches zero, our
discrete time model converges to their model. On the other hand. as the time interval h
approaches zero, our discrete time model converges to the continuous time model in chapter
3 while the CV model does not converge, as trading frequency increases without bound.
The relationship between the three models is described in diagram 4-1. The solutions to
the CV model, however, quantitatively have a limiting property when h - 0, although in
the limit, the CV model has no solution. The solutions for our continuous time model on
the right hand corner of diagram 4-1 exhibit the same limiting characteristics as trading
cost vanishes, i.e., c - 0.
This last convergence between the right two models in diagram 4-1 can be seen in Figure
4-2, which shows what happens to the solution of our continuous time equilibrium when
trading costs vary. It is clear that when there is almost no transaction cost, the solution has
the same properties as the solution to the CV model in the near continuous trading case.
For example, the trading intensity of the insider can be arbitrarily large and the uncertainty
E of the market maker can be arbitrarily close to zero for sufficiently small transaction costs
c. The comparative statics when c varies are straightforward. Since transaction cost is the
Discrete
time model
in chapter 4
CV model
h-->O
h-->0
Continuous
time model
in chapter 3
Limit not
exist
Figure 4-1: relation between the models
only factor keeping the impatient insider away from aggressive trading, the insider's trading
intensity increases as transaction cost decreases. Moreover, as transaction cost decreases,
price impact increases, and equivalently, market depth decreases. The reason for this is
intuitive. As c decreases, the trading volume of the insider 3 (g - g) increases. The market
maker anticipates this in equilibrium, therefore he believes that a larger proportion of the
aggregate order flow comes from the insider traders. As a result, the market maker moves
prices more responsively to the total order flow. This means that market depth is shallower
when transaction cost is lower. Finally when transaction cost is lower, the higher trading
volume of the insider carries more information; therefore, the market maker's uncertainty
about the signal E is less.
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Figure 4-2: Equilibrium with various transaction cost parameters. E is the market maker's
uncertainty. a and 6 are parameters within the insider's value function. 3 is the insider's
rate of trading size. A is the inverse of market depth.
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4.3 Conclusion
In this chapter we examine a discrete time model that nests both the CV model and the
continuous trading model in chapter 3. When trading frequency increases to infinity, the
model converges to the continuous trading model described in chapter 3. On the other
hand, when trading cost approaches zero, the model converges to the CV model. The
nesting relation between these models is illustrated in diagram 4-1. The solution to our
discrete time model does not attain the strong form efficiency property, as opposed to the
CV model. Some details of the comparison have been provided in this chapter.
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Chapter 5
Discrete Signals at Random Times
5.1 Discrete Signals at Random Times
As noted in the previous section, close to the end of the trading interval, the insider
anticipates the next signal to occur, thus he will submit orders of enormous size to use up
his information from the last signal, no matter how tiny his information advantage is. It
would be interesting to study a different framework, where the time of the occurrence of the
next signal to the insider is not guaranteed. Put it in another way, as each private signal
occurs, the insider cannot forecast the occurence of the next signal without uncertainty.
Mathematically. the previous model assumes that the length of the time interval between
two consecutive signals is deterministic (and fixed for simplicity). Now we want to alter this
assumption such that the signals come stochastically. To maintain the stationary market
assumption, we require that the random variables representing the arrival time of each
new signal g are independent and identically distributed. It is standard to assume that
this random variable follows an exponential distribution. However, we adopt a truncated
exponential distribution with the following probability density function
f (t)= 0 < t < T.1 - e-F
The benefit of this distribution is that it has finite support. The interpretation of this
distribution is that if the next signal does not arrive at or before time T, the insider will
produce his own signal at time T. This can be regarded as a model in which the insider
is a firm with a R&D department. For example suppose T is two weeks, and the mean
of the untruncated exponential distribution is 2 days. What happens then is that the
insider expects to receive the next signal at a stochastic time, with the average at 2 days.
However, if two weeks pass and no signal occurs, then the firm's R&D department acquires
and reveals the signal perfectly. Potentially the acquisition of the signal imposes some cost
to the R&D department; however, we ignore that cost in this paper, for simplicity.
Only the assumption on the timing of the private signals is changed. Therefore, in the
derivation of the equilibrium, most steps are intact. The insider's optimization problem is
the one that needs more careful calculation. As before, the insider's optimization problem is
an infinite horizon problem that can be broken down into two parts. First, a discrete time
dynamic programming with infinite horizon, and second, countable identical continuous
time stochastic control problems within each interval between the two consecutive signals.
Suppose the current time is t and this is the time at which the insider receives the 1th
signal. The Bellman equation for the discrete time dynamic programming is
V (1, gt - gtm)
sup E4{j r(st) [(g" - ) 0, - c 2 ]t] dt + TV(I+
{ Ot t< s< t+ l- 
-}  
1
We can solve this discrete time Bellman equation by considering the continuous time
stochastic control problem with finite horizon [t, t + r], as in the last section.
sup E s [(g; ) , - C 02] ds + re- r (1 + 1,9~, )
0t9 1,O<9.11 TI T
subject to
d (g' - g)
=- [ + (s) V] (g' - gm ) dt - A (s) Osdt - A (s) oudB + [E - EI (s)] vt-aDldBD
However, the horizon is random which brings a new complication. Below, we follow the
approach in Richard (1975) to solve this stochastic control problem with uncertain horizon.
Suppose 7 has the probability density expressed above. We define the following related
functions
1 - e - t  e - o r - e- T
F (t) = - T G (t) = 1 - F (t) = 1 -
f(T) de-c oTf (T, t) - f  T > tG (t) e-o_ -,o'
h(t) f(t,t) o
where F is the cumulative distribution function, G is the tail cumulative probability distri-
bution, and f is the conditional probability density for random time 7 = T conditional on
T > t. Finally h is the hazard function in survival analysis. With these notations, it can
be shown that in the above per period stochastic control problem, the objective function
is equivalent to the following
1 ' o
sup Et - { G (T) e [(g- g) OT cO]
{O9,t<s<T} G (t)
+f (T) e-rTV (1 + 1,gT, g)}dT.
We denote the value function by J (s, g'\ gi). Then, the discrete time Bellman equation
is simply
V (1, go,g m) = J (O, g - ) (5(5.1)
We will address this equation later. For the finite horizon per period problem, the transver-
sality condition is
J (T, g g-  ) = e-V'TE V (1 + 1, g , g) . (5.2)
Proposition 12 The value function of the infinite horizon dynamr programmng is
V (1, g - ) = n (0) ( g m) 2 + (0)
where a and 6 are determmzstic functzons on interval [0, T] sattzsfying the ordinary difer-
entzal equations
ra (s)) + '(s)- 2a (s) { [ + (s) v 2 a 2]
{ [1 - 2a (s) A (s)] e [a (0) a(s)] =0,2c e- - e-OT
-r (s) + (5 (s) + a (s) [(A (s) owU)2 + ()]2 2D2
+ [6 (0) - 6 (s) + a (0) E (s)] = 0,e- - -
with the terminal value conditions
a (T) = a (0),
6() = ~ (0) + a (0) E (T-) .
The inszder's optzmal control zs gzven by
= 1- 2a (s)A(s) (gI )
2c
Figure 5-1 shows the plot with parameters c = 0.004, 0 = 1 and T = 2. We mainly
compare this plot with figure 2-2. In the previous model, the next signal will arrive at
time t = 1. Now our assumptions are such that once a signal occurs, the arrival time
of the next signal is distributed as a truncated exponential. with cumulative distribution
function plotted in the lower-left panel. In other words, the next signal is only guaranteed
to arrive before t = 2, however, it can arrive before any time t for 0 < t < 2 with positive
probability. It is clear that this randomness of signal arrival gives the insider tile incentive
to trade more aggressively at tile beginning of the interval between signals, since he expects
the new signal to arrive at any time. On the other hand, if the new signal has not arrived
at time t > 1, then the insider will not raise his trading intensity rapidly by a large amount
since he is still not sure when the next signal will occur, as opposed to the previous model
with fixed arrival time. in which the insider will rapidly escalate his trading intensity just
before the new signal arrives at t = 1. In summary, the new pattern for the insider's
trading is that trading intensity is smoother with stochastic arrival of signals. Moreover,
this further explains that the information asymmetry between the insider and the market
maker declines more quickly in the new model.
5.2 Conclusion
We examine the case in which the arrival time of the next signal is not deterministic. With
the arrival time following the truncated exponential distribution, we show that the insider
trades more smoothly. He trades more aggressively right after receiving a new private
signal, and less aggressively as time passes by, relative to the case in which signal arrival
time is a fixed constant.
There remain several unanswered questions. One involves separation of the effect of
risk aversion of the market maker from risk aversion of the insider. Either one may induce
the insider to trade slowly. However, in Wang (1993) both market maker and insider are
risk averse. It is interesting to study the properties of tile equilibrium when only one of
them is risk averse. Intuitively, risk aversion of the market maker means he will charge
more for large orders, for bearing inventory risk. Risk aversion of the insider, on the other
cost= 0.004, 0=1, Tbar=2
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Figure 5-1: The insider receives signals at random times. The arrival time of the signal
has a truncated exponential distribution with parameters p = 1, and T = 2. The cost
coefficient is c = 0.004.
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hand, means that the insider will refrain from submitting large order flows since he not only
seeks to utilize his private information, but also needs to take into account the precision
of that private information. This concern limits his trading aggressiveness.
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Appendix A
Market Maker's Pricing Rule
Proof of the market maker's pricing rule.
Proof. Under our assumption, the dividend growth is a mean-reverting process. The
solution to the Orstein-Ulenbeck process is
gs = e-K(s-t) gt + ( e-K(s-t)) e K(s u) CdB
and therefore the conditional expectation given time t filtration is
Etgs = c-K(s-t)Et [gt] + (1 e-K(s-t) )
To solve the SDE for the dividend process Dt, we use a integrating multiplier
d [ev tD t] = vevtDtdt + c" (v (gt
= e"t (vgtdt + 0DdBD)
e IT DT = Ce"Dt + ST
c"8 (vgsds + UDdBD)
D t ) dt + JDdBD )
This implies that the dividend process can be represented by
DT = e-v(T-t)Dt + e-v(T-s) [vgds + 9DdS]
Take conditional expectation we have
EtDT = e-v(T-t)Dt + Te-" T-s)Et [gs] ds
= e-"(T-t)Dt + v
= eC-(T - t) D t + v (gt - )
T-s) [e-K(s-t)t (--
T e-(T-s) e-K(s-t)ds
- K(s-t)) ] ds
+ i e-v(T- )ds
-= v(T-t)Dt + -K(T-t)
+ (1 - e - 'v(T - t))
Market maker sets the price to be the discounted future dividend payout
Pt = Et e-r(T-t)DTdT
1 v 1
1 Dt + O
v+r v-K r+K
1
- Dt + (ge
v+r ( +K) (v+r)
1
S Dtr +
v+r
1
- +Dt +
V+r
(r + K) ( + )9t
(r + K) (v + 9
( r r + v (r K) (v + r)
vK
+ r (r + v) (K + r)
S)(t 
-
+ )+ (
r
1r
r+v1 
9) + (
C-v(T-t) ) (gt
Appendix B
Proof to the Propositions
Proof of proposition 7
Proof. By standard Kalinan-Bucy filtering technique
Liptser and Shiryaev (2001)), we have
= ~ (9 - o) dt
3 (t) [ (t)(g - ) dZ]+ 2 -
+ D(
(for example see Wang (1993) or
) dt + o7dB D ] (B.1)
and
E' (t) = -2KE (t) + 2 _+2 (t) (B.2)
Proposition follows once At and yt are defined. *
Proof of proposition 8 (insider's optimization)
Proof. Let J (t, g, g) be the value function, then we can write the HJB equation of the
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-
- 2
dg = (g - g) dt + E (t) (3, v)
0
0 (t)
d gdt
2 DD - ( ['1 -
insider as
O = sup Jt + gK( gt) +
+ _J (,2 (t) 2 2 + 12)
1
J+ [(g ) 2+ [K(2 )+AO+ y (g
-(gj)) ti- 2 -t
First order condition is given by
J A + (g - 2cO) e-r = 0
0 = (JAert + g -g)
2Now conjecture th  value function is
Now conjecture the value function is
(B.3)
J (tg, g)= -crta (t) (g
We can derive the following properties of the value function.
Jt = rerta (t) ( g)2 - rT-t6
J = -2ecrt(g )
Jg = 2e-rta (B.4)
Substitute back into equation (B.3) we can get
1
8 = (g - g) (-2aA + 1) (B.5)2c
Plug the value function and the solution to the control variable Ot back into HJB equation
)2 + e-rt6 (t)
and we get
S= -re-'rta(t) (g - )2 _ rert6 + 2e ta (g - ) K (9 - t) + ae-rt 2
- 2e-rt(g g) K + (g - )(-2aA + 1) + v (g -)
2c
+ aert ( 2 (t) +
+ -rt 2 (-2aA + 1) - c (g - )(-2AA + 1) 21
Simplify the above identity and we have
0= -r (g- )2 - 2 lg- g)2 (-2zn + 1) + 1 -2aK (g )2
2c
- r6 + a (A2 t2+ 2 --
There are two terms. The first term is a quadratic term of the estimation error of the
market maker (g - )2 , and the second term is a constant. Letting both equal to zero we
obtain the following two equations
0 =-r6 + co + (A2 2 2
0= -ra - 2a (-2aA+l1)+'u+n]
2c
+ (-2aA + 1) - c (-2c + 1) 2
where the second equation can be shown to be equivalent to the one given in the proposition.
proof of proposition 9.
Proof. Recall the definition of the notations
AE3
We can see that 3 a r,/E. In proposition (8), insider's strategy is given by 3 =
1 (-2aA + 1). By equating the two expressions. we find
Ao 1 - 2aA
E 2c
Therefore we can solve a as a function of some other parameters
2cAo)
E
In the steady state, E (t) is a constant, recall that equation (B.2) implies equation (3.7)
9 2 X 2
which is equivalent to
0 = -2KE + r - A 2
A2 =1 (
071
2KE + o2
Equation (3.9) can be expressed as
0 = -r5 + 2N(T
( 2 a r( 2 - 27"
2nKE - c
aK(E - 08
2
D
(B.6)
V E2
20DY
(B.7)
(B.8)
1
a = -
2A
Equation (3.10) is equivalent to
0 = -ra - 2a 2 + , +
D
0 = -ra - 2a 2 + K, +
aD
0= -ra - 2a 2 +K +
0 ( 2cA) (r + 2K +
1 2
(-2A + 1)2
1 ( (I - 2aA)) ' 2aA+1) 2
-au( (-2aA + 2+1)
2C
2Ev2 
-
2 ) - 2cA3u
The above four equations (B.6)(B.7)(B.8)(B.9) can jointly determine the steady state equi-
librium values of (E, A. a, 6). The remain two parameters (3, 3,) follows. z Proof of propo-
sition 10. Proof. The market maker's inference is the same as the Chau and Vayanos
(2007) setup, therefore we have
9~ = (1 -Kh) QI1 + Khg + D (D - (1 -4 h) D 1 - vhg_-1 ) + AX (xI + ul)
where
(1AD = (I
(1
Zg (32j7Ax =
- (1-
Y9g (3 2 a2
Kh) EZvu2h
+ u2~ ) + c~ uh
- ih) 3Z2
+ v h2 ) + u7u h
Kh) 2  22 h
+ - + (T2h
+ 2 2h2) 2 2
The Bellman equation is
V (gi- I 9-i) = maxE x (gi - ) ch 1 2 + F-rhV (gl, 1)]01-1 --1) = XlX 1
(B.9)
Market Maker's estimation error in period 1 is
91-1) - ADED,l - , (xl + al) + Eg,l
Substituting into the Bellman equation, we find
B (g-1 - 11)2 + C
= maxxt { [1 - ( + AD) h] [g-1
Xl
+ e-rh B ([1 ( + vAD) h] [g -1 1-1 x 2  2 2 2 21-1] Axx) 2 + A2o2h + XO h + O- h
The first order equation is
0 = [1 - (K + vAD) h] (gl-1
2Aze-rhB ([1
1-1) - 2Axxl - 2ch-lxl
(K + VAD) h (yl-1
which implies
x 1 = 3 (9g-1 - 1-1)
with
[1 - (i + AD) h] (1 - 2Ae-'rhB)
2 (Ax + ch - 1 - A e-rhB)
Substitute into Bellman equation, we have
B (91-1 - 9 1 ) 2 + C
= rhB 2 2 2 -2 + -rhC
[1 - ( + VAD) h]2 (1 - 2Axe-'rhB) 2
4 (Ax + ch - 1 A e-rhB) (9l-1 - 9-1)2
+ C-rhB [1 - (N- + AD) h]2 [9-1
+c}
91-1) Ax 1)
gl - 91 = [1 - (K + vAD)h] (gl-1
91-1] - Axxl} - ch-1 2
91-1] 2
which yields
[1 - (K + pAD) h]2 (1 2Axe-rhB) 2
4 (A + ch - 1 - A2 e-rhB)
= [1 - (K + AD) h]2 ((1 2Axe - rh
+ e rhB [1 - (, + vAD) h]2
B) 2 + 4e-'rhB (Ax + ch - 1
4(Ax +ch- - A e-rhB)
1 A rh It,-I
[I (K + AD) h]2  1 - t 1+ G c
4 (Ax + ch - 1 - A2e
C 1 e-rhB ( 2 2 2 2 2) hC 1-C D D  x
Now we write the equation for B again
4A2 -rhB 2 +4{e-rhch-' [1Ax +4[ (K + PAD) h]
2 (Ax + ch - 1) B [1 (K + PAD) h]2 = 0
The quadratic equation has solution
B =
B- 2A2erh [
A = r{hch-l[
Se rch- 1 [I - (t
1 - (K + PAD) h] 2
z + vAD) h 2 (_ Ax + Ch-1)
(Ax + ch-1) } 2 _ -rh [1 ( + vAD) h]2
__I x -
Proof of proposition 11.
Proof. Equation for 3 becomes
Equation for Ax becomes
E9 3
x =2 h- ~g
The above two equations imply
2cAX~2
1 - 2AxB =
Y1
B =
A2 e-rhB)x
rhB)
3
h
1 - 2AxB
2c
Equation for AD becomes
Equation for Eg becomes
EDIV
AD =2
D
A2 2 2 2 2 22 + 2KE = 0
When h = 0, equation for B becomes
(1- 2AxB) 2 = 4cB [r + 2K + 2ADv]
(2cAt2
Equation for C becomes
CEg - 2cAiTX [2+222c EgA r + 2
AxE Y I
Cgv2
+ 2 (DD
C = 1B (AD D + A2 +)1"
This finishes the proof S
Proof of proposition 2.
Proof. Formally
dgS, (= gs) ds + dB S
dD, = vgsdt + UDdB D
Proof of proposition 3.
Proof. Then Market maker's filtering is
S-K
2 -D2
0 g dt +
-K_ p 2 D J2 L -(D1
0a
0
dBD
dBU
dB 9
d 9 K dt +
g9 1
-rj
and the observed variables are
d dt +
0 3s g
The solution to the filtering is
d ]m [ Kg dt +
g- m MI r
-Kn
g - gm dt +[y%_4gm
cD 0 0]
0 a, 0
= dt +
r, EV2D 2
+ 
D
S[Zr () v + Zv] a1
1Em2 D
0
2 u 2
O s (71
2 () 3s2 1j
z (s) so 122 I
gm dt
dB _
m
dBD
dBu
[mi 1 anF3m1 VJD1
d D
Bm2 0
0 0
7u 0
dBD
dBu
dBS
0
_ 
E 2 D2
gm dt
0
3s
dBD
dBu
dB 9
and
dBD
dB"
V 0 0 0
+ +
0 6, -Ev 0
o g - m dt +
3sl g tgZm
dY = [ K
ds EV2 U 2 
-K
v 0 0
E +E K
0
Em + m -
Ev 2 7 2  E Z
2 (-2
D D
0 2D
0
T
0
Kn Ziu~oj
([ Vs c00 3s-
Simplify the Riccati equation,
dsm [dS2 2
2
+
0
0
(K+ E u2-2 2 )
o
E2V2-2
Emy
2v v
11 12
zM E]12 22
C 12 s3IEM 38 ]22Bj
+m [
+E
-H
V2 2r- 2D
O EV
21 [ S
T
0
K- 2 --2
E v + EU
12CZ~~iO - ~Z1
-2nE + Yv 2 - 2 y im12 D 11[ 2 o
() E2U2 D
Z D20-D2 Z
-2KE' 2 a2C, - 2g-2 m2 V D 11 D , 12
2Ev 2 oD 2ZiEm - 2 (K + EV 2 0F3 2 ) EM
D 12 D nT ~ 22
[3v22D2  m32 u- 2  E, UT-2v m v + ZZr(2 1 1 2
11 D 2 /s u 11 D 12 1 O 2  2 22s( 12 2 22) 2 D2 2 2 2 V 2 u 21222
and therefore
2E\ + a (m) 22 2 11 9 11 D
dEm
12 -2Em- E 2 2 Emds D 
12
22= -2 (K + ElV.2 - ) 2 m
ds D 22
V 2 (- 2E Cm -Em E 3 20-22D 11 12 22 12 2
m 2 2 l 2 _ sm )2 -2
12 OD - 22 2 a u
Think about the infinite steps. At the beginning of each interval [t, t + A], insider starts a
( 3)s 2 . 2
brand new filtering problem, with initial observation gt, and initial E (t) = 0. The Market
maker. also starts a new filtering problem, however, he knows that gt = g', therefore, at
initial time s = t, he would force gtFm = gI.Fm and this implies
t K][9t ]
9 Em (t)
Now we just need to determine g~m and EC (t). Suppose that he uses the last interval result
on g (discards results on gZ), that is
Cm (t) = (t-)
If this is the case, then we can show that for all s the following hold
Em (S) = E2, (S)
and further more,
gm (s) = g m (s)
holds for all s C [t, t + A]. To satisfy the stationary condition, one sufficient condition is
that
t
t + A dE, (s) = 0
Er (t)
11 
-
and therefore at each end point of the interval Em (t + nA) - E'. It is clear that
dgm ' = gm) dt + Emi /D 2 Ej 2 -s 2 (K2(gg] dt +
1 11 D 2 U ( s (g I 91m)
= K(g(- gm) dt + {C' (s) v2a 2 (g 9M) + EM (S) 3 2 (2
12n
rDdBD
~udB
gim)} dt
1)
+ E, (s) vj-ldBD + E' (s) 3s 1 dBu
Therefore we can substitute the observable processes (Xt, Zt, Dt) into the above expression,
and the linear pricing rule is
dgm K( g) dt - m (s) v2 -D2 gmdt
+ A (s) Odt + - (s) vgds + 3 (s) cDdBD + A (s) oudBu
where A (s) E (s) 3 2 and (s) - Er (s) vaD 2
Proof of proposition 4 and 5.
Proof. We have
d (g' - n) = dg - (- gn) ds + (s) ids
- X(s) [Ods + oa,dB] - (s) { (vD 2 -1 [dg'- K
= - (K + ' (s) v) (g' gi) ds - A (s) [OOds + orudB]
S') ds] + vg ds
Em' (s) V'UD sD
(K.+- (s) )
9m
A (s) [Osds + audBu] - Y' (s) vaD ldfzD
= K (j - gm ) ds 7 (s) vyg'ds + A (s) [Ods + audBu] + - (s) [dD, + vDsds]
Let A'(s)A(s)
d(cA(s) ?_- M)
=eA(s) [(g' - gm) A' (s) ds + A (s) d (g'
=eA(s) (s)
g -)A = eA(lA)-A((l--1)A) (gA
+ e-A((l+1)A) 0 C A (s) { A (s) [Osds + uadB"] ZE (s) V(T'DdB zD12 D 8
By Nash equilibrium. insider knows that the pricing rule is
dg m  ( ) ds -y (s) vg m ds + A (s) [Ods + adB"] + ,(s) [dD, + vDsds]
Recall that
Cv
dg= (g - g )ds + dBJD
9D
K (g g) ds + EvaD2 [ vgIds + dD, + vDds]S D S i ~~
This implies that
dD, + vDds = (EJD2 ) - 1 [dg K (g - g) ds] + vg'ds
then we have
d (g - m) = dg, K g') ds + . (s) vgmt ds
- A (s) [0,ds + audB'] - (s) (Ev D2)-1 [dg
= - (K + (s) v) (g - gm) ds - A (s) [Ods + CT
(g - gY)ds] +vgds}
dB"] - i~2 (s) v(U dB D
The long term infinite horizon objective function is as follows. Suppose current time is
We have
mgl )1
t = IA, the discrete timie Bellman equation is given by
V (1, gt - gtm)
= sup
{O ,t<s<t+A}
E {jt+iA
El t t+
e-r(s-t) (g g) - C02 dt + e-rV (1 + 1, t+, 9t +)}
where the state variables evolve according to
gt+A = e- Ag (1 - e ) +~ e (-(SU)cagdBg
t- exp (
g'M+A = exp ( t A ) ) ei(S) [Kjds + - (s) gds + AsOds]dt
+ exp (-2I(t i A)) [S) V D-) (s) dJ3lD + ,aupdBu]
Notice that the state variables are both discrete time stochastic processes, observable to
the insider at each discrete time IA. The evolution of the state variables can be proved as
follows. Recall that
dg = ( - g) ds + cgdB9
dgm = (g- ) ds + (s) (g' - gm) ds + AXO~ds + E' (s) vold$bD + AsiudBu
where ' (s) - EZ (s) v12D 2 . Let ;' (s) (s) + K. This implies that
gt+A = e- 9gt + (1 - e ) + t+ e- (s-u) gdB g
and
d[exp ( (s)) gm] = e (')dgm + gmei(s) ' (s)
= (s) [ gds + (s) g ds + Aosds + S SvlDd + AIDodBU]
I S Jf
this implies that
t+A
gt+ = exp (- (t + A))
t+A
es(s) [jIds + (s) gsds + AXOds]
0 (S) [I, 1-YD (s) df, + A8J~dBuL]
where the insider's strategy controls this state variable through
exp {- [ (t + A) - (s)} ) A (s) Ods.
Now let us consider the insider's short term (per period) objective function
sup E' {j t+
{Ot,t<s<t+A} t
e
-
r(s - t) [(s g - c0 2] dt + e V (1 1, gt+CA,g )
d (g - gm') = -[K + (s) v] (g - gm) dt - A (s) Osdt
-A (s) oudB" + [Y - Yf1 (s)] vaDu ldbD
This is the following finite horizon stochastic control problem. Denote the value function
by J (s, g' - g ). Then the discrete time Bellman equation is just
V (1, gt, Y ) = J (0, g - g') .
We will deal with this equation later. For the finite horizon per period problem, the
terminal value is
J (A, g+A - giA) = e-rAE+a V (1 + 1, gt+A, gmA)t t+ t+ -Stta
Let d = g' - g, then the HJB equation is
0 = sup J, - Jd [K + Ell (S) V 2 2
+ Jdd [(A (s) 7)2 + Z
+ e-" (s - g m) O,
( 2 2 -2111\ 1 "
e- rsc62
then the FOC is
which implies
We can conjecture that
J (s, d) =-e" ra (s)(g 7m) 2±+() }
Jd = e-rS" { 2a (s) (g - gm)I
Then FOC becomes
[1 - 2a (s) A (s)]
2c
1 - 2a (s) A (s)
2c
J, = (-,ra (s) + a' (s)) e-"S (g
m) +A(s) 8s
JdA (S) + -rs ( 9m) 2e-rScO = 0
-e"rsJdA (s) + (g 9gs)
gm)
gmi) 2 ,-rs (s) + C (s )
Plug back into HJB we have
0 = (-ra (s) + o' (s))e-s (g
e-rs2a (s) (g
m )2 _ e-rsS (s) + e-rs (s)
gm) m [K + S) (s) V 2 D2 ] (g' m)
+ er" (s) [(A) ( ) )2 + [Z j (s)] 2 v22] + C rsc [1 - 2a (s) A (s)] (g g)2c
Simplify
0 = (-ra(s) + ' (s)) (g
- 2a (s) [n + EM (s) V 2 0 (g - mg) 2
+ a (S) [(A ((S))2] m 2 V20 D 2 _Y m 2[1 - 2a (s) A (s)] 22cc 
The following two equations are sufficient
[1 - 2a (s) A (s)]20 = -ra (s) + a' (s) - 2a (s) [K + E (s) 22 ]  [1 ( (S4c
0o = -rd(s) + ' (s)+ a(s) [(A (s) ,)2 + [Z
Now by the discrete time Bellman equation (2.10) we have
v (1, gt, gt) = a (0) (g
Zm (S)]2 V2Du21D
9gm2 + 6 (0)
To satisfy the terminal condition (2.11), we must have
) 2 + (A)} - E I V (1 + 1, t+A,g tA)
gM) 2
r~5(s) + ' (s)
eCr (g?+,
Substitute in the discrete time Bellman equation
a (A) (g'S - gA) 2 + 6 (A) = E+A J (0, gt+A
= E+ a (0) (gt+A
Note that
EZ-+aVt+A = 9t'+
Et+Ag92 A ar+A + (
t4 2
2 (
This implies that
E a (0) (gtt+A _ A)2 + 6 (0)
= E a (0gt) + - 2 9t+AgtA + (gt+A)2 + 6 (0)
= a (0) (z (A) + (gA) 2 - 2 9+AAt, + (giA)2 + 6 (0)
Sa(0) (g,A9 - gA)2 + a (0) E (A) + 6 (0)
Therefore equation (2.11) becomes
S2 (0) (
gt+a) + ~a=(0) (g t+ gt"4A) 2 + a (0) Y (A) + 6 (0)
This further implies
a(A) =(o0)
6(A) = (o) (A) + 6 (O)
Proof of proposition 12.
9t+)A) i 6 (0)
a (A) (94+A
Proof. The long term infinite horizon objective function is as follows. Suppose current
time is t = IA, the discrete time Bellman equation is given by
v (1, gt, gtm)
r(s-t) _[( gm) Os (o] dt + - T v (I + 1, g9t+ , 9 )}Ssup E tt
{Ot,t<s<t+r} t
To simplify the notation, we can let t = 0. It is clear that the state variables evolve
according to
.9t+a = eC t + (1 - e- ) +
t+A
gtra = exp (- (t + A)) e (s ) [L
t+sA
'(dt[
C K(S-" " )gdB'
ds + (s) g'ds + AOds]
ID" (s) d tD + AscrudBu]
Notice that the state variables are both discrete time stochastic processes, observable to
the insider at each discrete time IA. The evolution of the state variables can be proved as
follows. Recall that
dg = (g
dgm (
g) ds + agdB9
gS) ds + 1 (s) (g - gm) ds + A ds + EmZ (s) voD- d D + XA8cdB 1
where '" (s) - E' (s) v2 aD 2. Let 5' (s) = - (s) + K. This implies that
gt+A = eC t + (1 - e ) +
. t
e- h(s-) JrgdB9
and
d [exp (f (s)) gm] = e(S)dgm + g ,'(s) / (s)
=- s0(s) [hYds + o (s) g'ds + AOds + sv DdB 1D + A o rudBu
this implies that
t+Agt+A = exp (-,(t + Ax))
t+
+ exp (- (t + A)) t
t+
where the insider's strategy controls this state variable through
exp
Suppose T < T. Let the CDF be
F (t)
,{- [, (t + A) - , (s)]} A (s) o8ds.
1- e - t
1 - e- ¢T
t _ e-T
1 - e- ¢ 7
G (t) =1- F(t)=
f (t) = 1 - e-¢O
f(T)f (T, t) f (T)
G (t) = C IT>te-ht - e--T
h (t) = f (t, t) =
e-Nt _ e-r O
Now let us consider tie insider's short term (per period) objective function
gm) 0 - cO2 ds + -)V ( + 1 9(lY , g )sliOt, p E { rs
e"') [ngds + 1 (s) g'ds + AOsds
eC( [ 1 O (s) d D + AsorudBu
J (0, o - gm) =
J (t, g) - 9tm)
sup El f (T, t) e-T [ (g
{ O,t<s<T}
sup E? {G (T) e- " [(g
{Ot ,t<s<T} G(t)
+ f (T) e-rTV (1 + 1,gT, g)}dT
g) O - c 2 ds + e-r ( + 1,g,~) dT
gm) OT T- cI
subject to
d (gI - gn)
= [s + (s) v] (g' m) dt A (s) Osdt A (s) oUdBU + [E - EC (s)] vorDdB D
V (1,g ,g," ) = EsV (I + 1,gs,g"1)
This is the following finite horizon stochastic control problem. Denote the value function
by J (s, g' - g"). Then the discrete time Bellman equation is just
V (1,go, g') = J (0O,gI - g).
We will deal with this equation later. For the finite horizon per period problem, the
transversality condition is
J (T, g m ) = -rTEV (1 + 1, g, g)
Let d g - gn , then the HJB equation is
0 = sup Jt d r,+ (t) 2  ] (g gin) + A(t) O
+ Jdd [(A (t) )2 + [ m (t]2 02 -2
+{ert [(g gm) Ot cOt] +h(t) rtV (1 + 1,gt, gm)}-h(t) Jf Yt t t tY~Y
then the FOC is
JdA (S) + e-rs(g gm)
which implies
8
ersJdA (s) + (g
We can conjecture that
J (s, d) = ' " s a (s) (g gm) 2 ±+3(8)
Jd -= rs {2a (s) (gl - gm)I
Then FOC becomes
[1 - 2a (s) A (s)]g
2c
1 - 2a (s) A (s)
2c
Js = (-ra (s) + a' (s)) e-" (g gM)
2
re-rs (S) + - , (S)
Plug back into HJB we have
0= (-r (s) + ,' (s))e" ( r 9n) 2 re-,r6 (S) + cr61 (S)
im)
2
l ()] 2 V2] +-2
h (s) c " a (s) (gs_
g 2c
+ -r"U (S) [(A (s) 0,)2+
+ h(s) e-V (1 + 1.g, g, )
2e-'c"c = 0
gim)
gm)
-rs2a (s) (gS - gi) { [ + E,7 (s) v 2 7D2] (gf
V1(g , 9m) = Es J (0, gs
=E
, {c(O) (g
= a (0) ((g) 2
= (0) (g-
g9) = Es (0) (gs 9m )2 + 6 (0)
S2 gg' +(g,)2 + (o)}
+ Z (s)- 2gg' + (g)2) + 3(0)
g )2 + 6 (0) + a (o) (s)
9.31 ()E S
0 = (- ra (s) + a' (s) (g' gm)2 rS (s) + '' (s)
2a (s) (g - gm ) { [, + EL' (s) V 2 D2 ] I(
+ a (s) [(A (s) )2 + [Z
+ h(s) {a(0) (g'- g7)'
l (S)]2 2 -2 +L1 \ VS , ]
9m) I
[1 - 2a (s) A (s)] (g
c 
2c
Y- (s) - h (s) a (s) (9
The following two equations are sufficient
ra (s) + a' (s) 2a (s) ( [K + Em (s)v22]
[1- 2a (s) A (s)] 2 - (0)
2+ - [a(0)
2c e-** - e-4T
a (s)] = 0=o
y[ ()]2 V20D211 D
- -
- [6 (0) 6 (s) + a(0)) ()] = 0
The terminal condition is
J (T, gz m) =  -rTE V ( + 1Iylg
e (T (0)m)-g} + 6 (0) + a (0) (O) (T)
Recall that
Simplify
}M)}
9m) 2
,.6 (s) + 6' (s) + a (s) [(A (s) ,) 2 + [
{- r (T) (g_ gm 2 + )
This implies
a (T) - (0)
6 (T) 6 (0) + a (0) E (T)
U
Appendix C
Solution to the Discrete Signal
Equilibrium
We want to represent all other functions using only E' and a. Notice that
3 (s)
1 - 2a (s) A (s)
EM (s)
A (s)= 12
s) U 12 (S)
E 1 2 3 = crA (s)
we can transform equation (2.8) to
= -2 (. + Zv2--2z m
ds (Zm 
2 V2 D 2
M S) 2
2 [coF + a (s) E21U[o+~)j() 12~
En (0) = E m (A) + (A)
O-Eml (S)
OL' " u 12 S)CVrra+n (S) ym S)
and we can transform equation (2.12) to
0 = -ra (s) + ' (s) 2a (s) [ + ( ' (s) + Y (s)) v2 2 2
a(0) = a(A)
Finally 3 is determined by
a ( Z~E (S) 2
L 2 [co7 + a (s) E; (s) + E, (S)2 20,2D2
6 (A) = a (O) (A) + (0).
6' (s) = r6 (s)
and
1 ca4
4 [cg2 + a (s) Er (s)]2
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